Systems and methods for workspace continuity and remediation

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods for modernizing workspace and hardware lifecycle management in an enterprise productivity ecosystem are described. In some embodiments, a client Information Handling System (IHS) may include a processor and a memory, the memory having program instructions that, upon execution by the processor, cause the client IHS to: receive, from a workspace orchestration service, one or more files or policies configured to enable the client IHS to instantiate a first workspace based upon a first workspace definition; allow a user to execute a non-vetted application in the first workspace; determine that the first workspace is compromised; and receive, in response to the determination, from the workspace orchestration service, one or more other files or policies configured to enable the client IHS to instantiate a second workspace based upon a second workspace definition, where the second workspace definition allows execution of a vetted application corresponding to the non-vetted application.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This specification claims the benefit of the filing date of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 16/670,516, which is titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODSFOR WORKSPACE CONTINUITY AND REMEDIATION,” which was filed on Oct. 31,2019, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference hereinin its entirety.

BACKGROUND

As the value and use of information continue to increase, individualsand businesses seek additional ways to process and store information.One option is an Information Handling System (IHS). An IHS generallyprocesses, compiles, stores, and/or communicates information or data forbusiness, personal, or other purposes. Because technology andinformation handling needs and requirements may vary between differentapplications, IHSs may also vary regarding what information is handled,how the information is handled, how much information is processed,stored, or communicated, and how quickly and efficiently the informationmay be processed, stored, or communicated. The variations in IHSs allowfor IHSs to be general or configured for a specific user or for specificuse such as financial transaction processing, airline reservations,enterprise data storage, global communications, etc. In addition, IHSsmay include a variety of hardware and software components that may beconfigured to process, store, and communicate information and mayinclude one or more computer systems, data storage systems, andnetworking systems.

IHSs provide users with capabilities for accessing, creating, andmanipulating data, and often implement a variety of security protocolsin order to protect this data. Historically, IHSs have been designed toimplement security paradigms that isolate them from possible securitythreats, much like a castle is designed and constructed to safeguardpersons within its walls. In the case of a network of IHSs, for example,security systems implement strategies that isolate the entire networkfrom threats. In effect, a set of castle walls is constructed around theentire network. While working from within the walls of such systems,users may be provided with secure and productive use of data.

However, security paradigms that isolate protected data within the wallsof a castle are increasingly frustrated by the realities of moderncomputing. Nowadays, users expect to access protected data using aplethora of different IHSs while located at a variety of physicallocations. In an effort to leverage the security of the system providingaccess to the data, current protocols for supporting remote access havesought to extend the defenses of the system to remote IHSs, essentiallyextending the castle walls to temporarily include all or part of theremote IHS s.

Another complication of modern computing is the user's expectation thatthey will be able utilize their own personal IHS s to access some or allof their protected data, even if those users are provided withenterprise-issued IHSs for accessing it. For administrators of suchsystems, this increases the difficulty in securing all manners in whichprotected data may be accessed. This difficulty is greatly expanded bythe need to support access to protected data using an ever-growing listof software applications, whether on a personal IHS or anenterprise-issued IHS. Moreover, the administration of such systems isfurther complicated by the need to support access to protected data froma variety of physical locations and via a variety of networks, includinguntrusted networks. Faced with such problems, systems for providingaccess to protected data are often burdensome to administer andultimately the data is insufficiently protected so as to facilitate itsproductive use.

A known technique for securing access to protected data accessed via anIHS is to isolate the data within a segregated or virtualizationenvironment that runs on the IHS using a virtual machine or container.Conventional types of virtualization environments provide varyingdegrees of isolation from the hardware and operating system of the IHS.However, similarly to the castle wall defenses of security paradigmsthat seek to isolate protected data within a secure perimeter,conventional virtualization environments are also ill-suited to moderncomputing. Particularly, these virtualization techniques establish anisolated computing environment on an IHS that allows a user to accessonly data and applications approved for that user.

In some instances, conventional virtualization techniques may determinethe data, applications, and protections to be provided by on an IHSbased solely on the identity of the user, and therefore tend toimplement all security protocols that would be necessary to secureaccess to all approved data and applications. As the inventors hereofhave recognized, however, not only does this result in complexvirtualization efforts that consume large portions of the memory andprocessing capabilities of the IHS, but conventional techniques also donot account for what the user actually intends to do while operating theIHS.

As the inventors hereof have further recognized, modern computing oughtto provide users with access to protected data via a variety of IHSs andat practically any location. Yet conventional virtualization fails toaccount for the specific context in which an IHS is being used during aparticular session, much less to account for changes to the context inwhich an IHS is used during a session. Furthermore, conventionalvirtualization techniques tend to provide support for many capabilitiesthat are not actually used. The overhead required to provide suchunnecessary capabilities unduly burdens the operation of an IHS anddegrades productivity and user experience.

SUMMARY

Systems and methods for workspace continuity and remediation aredescribed. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a clientInformation Handling System (IHS) may include a processor and a memorycoupled to the processor, the memory having program instructions storedthereon that, upon execution by the processor, cause the client IHS to:receive, from a workspace orchestration service, one or more files orpolicies configured to enable the client IHS to instantiate a firstworkspace based upon a first workspace definition; allow a user toexecute a non-vetted application in the first workspace; determine thatthe first workspace is compromised; and receive, in response to thedetermination, from the workspace orchestration service, one or moreother files or policies configured to enable the client IHS toinstantiate a second workspace based upon a second workspace definition,wherein the second workspace definition allows execution of a vettedapplication corresponding to the non-vetted application.

In some cases, the non-vetted application may include an applicationthat is not vetted, trusted, or recommended by an entity employing theworkspace orchestration service. For example, the non-vetted applicationmay be a first web browser and the vetted application is a second webbrowser.

The program instructions, upon execution, may cause the client IHS tonotify the workspace orchestration service that the non-vettedapplication is being executed, and the workspace orchestration servicemay be configured to select the one or more other files or policies inanticipation of the determination that the first workspace iscompromised. The program instructions, upon execution, may also causethe client IHS to determine that the first workspace is compromised inresponse to a security risk score being equal to or greater than athreshold value.

The threshold value may be a security target associated with the firstworkspace definition. The security risk score may be calculated basedupon at least one of: a risk metric associated with a locale of theclient IHS, a risk metric associated with the user of the client IHS, arisk metric associated with a network of the client IHS, a risk metricassociated with hardware of the client IHS, a risk metric associatedwith a requested datafile, or a regulatory risk metric associated withthe user, the locale, and the requested datafile.

The program instructions may cause the client IHS to migrate a workloadfrom the first workspace to the second workspace. The programinstructions, upon execution, may cause the client IHS to transmit, tothe workspace orchestration service, cloned user actions and datacollected during execution of the non-vetted application in the firstworkspace, where the one or more other files or policies comprise anindication of the cloned user actions and data that is applicable to thevetted application in the second workspace.

In another illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a memory storagedevice may have program instructions stored thereon that, upon executionby one or more processors of an IHS of a workspace orchestrationservice, cause the IHS to: provide, to a client IHS, one or more filesor policies configured to enable the client IHS to instantiate a firstworkspace based upon a first workspace definition; receive adetermination, from the client IHS, that that the first workspace hasbeen compromised during execution of a non-vetted application; andtransmit, in response to the determination, one or more other files orpolicies configured to enable the client IHS to instantiate a secondworkspace based upon a second workspace definition, where the secondworkspace definition allows execution of a vetted applicationcorresponding to the non-vetted application.

The program instructions may cause the IHS to receive a notificationfrom the client IHS that the non-vetted application is being executed,where the one or more other files or policies are selected inanticipation of the determination that the first workspace iscompromised. The program instructions may also cause the client IHS todetermine that the first workspace is compromised in response to asecurity risk score being equal to or greater than a threshold value,where the security risk score is calculated based upon at least one of:a risk metric associated with a locale of the client IHS, a risk metricassociated with a user of the client IHS, a risk metric associated witha network of the client IHS, a risk metric associated with hardware ofthe client IHS, a risk metric associated with a requested datafile, or aregulatory risk metric associated with the user, the locale, and therequested datafile.

The program instructions may also cause the IHS to receive, from theclient IHS, cloned user actions and data collected during execution ofthe non-vetted application in the first workspace, and wherein the oneor more other files or policies comprise an indication of the cloneduser actions and data that is applicable to the vetted application inthe second workspace.

In yet another illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a method mayinclude: transmitting, by a workspace orchestration service to a localmanagement agent, one or more files or policies configured to enable thelocal management agent to instantiate a first workspace based upon afirst workspace definition; receiving, at the workspace orchestrationservice from the local management agent, user actions and data collectedduring execution of a non-vetted application in the first workspace; andin response to a determination that the first workspace has beencompromised during execution of the non-vetted application,transmitting, by the workspace orchestration service to the localmanagement agent, one or more other files or policies configured toenable the local management agent to instantiate a second workspacebased upon a second workspace definition, where the second workspacedefinition indicates a vetted application corresponding to thenon-vetted application, and where the one or more other files orpolicies comprise at least a subset of the user actions and data to beapplied to the vetted application in the second workspace.

The method may include determining that the first workspace iscompromised in response to a security risk score being equal to orgreater than a threshold value, where the security risk score iscalculated based upon at least one of: a risk metric associated with alocale of the client IHS, a risk metric associated with a user of theclient IHS, a risk metric associated with a network of the client IHS, arisk metric associated with hardware of the client IHS, a risk metricassociated with a requested datafile, or a regulatory risk metricassociated with the user, the locale, and the requested datafile. Themethod may further include instructing the local management agent toterminate the first workspace.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention(s) is/are illustrated by way of example and is/arenot limited by the accompanying figures, in which like referencesindicate similar elements. Elements in the figures are illustrated forsimplicity and clarity and have not necessarily been drawn to scale.

FIG. 1 is a diagram depicting examples of components of an IHSconfigured to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management inan enterprise productivity ecosystem according to various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a diagram depicting an example of a method for modernizingworkspace and hardware lifecycle management in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIGS. 3A and 3B are a diagram depicting an example of a systemconfigured to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management inan enterprise productivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart describing certain steps of a process for securinga dynamic workspace in an enterprise productivity ecosystem, accordingto various embodiments.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart describing certain steps of a process for securinga dynamic workspace on an ongoing basis within an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 6 is a diagram depicting an example of a method for workspacecontinuity and remediation, according to various embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

For purposes of this disclosure, an IHS may include any instrumentalityor aggregate of instrumentalities operable to compute, calculate,determine, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate,switch, store, display, communicate, manifest, detect, record,reproduce, handle, or utilize any form of information, intelligence, ordata for business, scientific, control, or other purposes. For example,an IHS may be a personal computer (e.g., desktop or laptop), tabletcomputer, mobile device (e.g., Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or smartphone), server (e.g., blade server or rack server), a network storagedevice, or any other suitable device and may vary in size, shape,performance, functionality, and price. An example of an IHS is describedin more detail below. FIG. 1 shows various internal components of an IHSconfigured to implement certain of the described embodiments. It shouldbe appreciated that although certain embodiments described herein may bediscussed in the context of a personal computing device, otherembodiments may utilize various other types of IHSs.

FIG. 1 is a diagram depicting components of an example IHS 100configured for securing a dynamic workspace in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem. In some embodiments, IHS 100 may be employed toinstantiate, manage, and/or terminate a workspace, such as a secureenvironment that may provide the user of IHS 100 with access toenterprise data while isolating the enterprise data from the operatingsystem (OS) and other applications executed by IHS 100. In someembodiments, the construction of a workspace for a particular purposeand for use in a particular context may be orchestrated remotely fromthe IHS 100 by a workspace orchestration services, such as describedwith regard to FIG. 1. In some embodiments, portions of the workspaceorchestration may be performed locally on IHS 100. IHS 100 may beconfigured with program instructions that, upon execution, cause IHS 100to perform one or more of the various operations disclosed herein. Insome embodiments, IHS 100 may be an element of a larger enterprisesystem that may include any number of similarly configured IHSs innetwork communications with each other.

As shown in FIG. 1, IHS 100 includes one or more processor(s) 101, suchas a Central Processing Unit (CPU), operable to execute code retrievedfrom system memory 105. Although IHS 100 is illustrated with a singleprocessor, other embodiments may include two or more processors, thatmay each be configured identically, or to provide specialized processingfunctions. Processor(s) 101 may include any processor capable ofexecuting program instructions, such as an INTEL PENTIUM seriesprocessor or any general-purpose or embedded processors implementing anyof a variety of Instruction Set Architectures (ISAs), such as the x86,POWERPC®, ARM®, SPARC®, or MIPS® ISAs, or any other suitable ISA. In theembodiment of FIG. 1, processor(s) 101 includes an integrated memorycontroller 118 that may be implemented directly within the circuitry ofthe processor(s) 101, or memory controller 118 may be a separateintegrated circuit that is located on the same die as processor(s) 101.Memory controller 118 may be configured to manage the transfer of datato and from system memory 105 of IHS 100 via high-speed memory interface104.

System memory 105 that is coupled to processor(s) 101 via memory bus 104provides processor(s) 101 with a high-speed memory that may be used inthe execution of computer program instructions by processor(s) 101.Accordingly, system memory 105 may include memory components, such assuch as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), NAND Flash memory,suitable for supporting high-speed memory operations by processor(s)101. In some embodiments, system memory 105 may combine both persistent,non-volatile memory and volatile memory.

In certain embodiments, system memory 105 includes secure storage 120that may be a portion of the system memory designated for storage ofinformation, such as access policies, component signatures, encryptionkeys, and other cryptographic information, for use in hosting a secureworkspace on IHS 100. In such embodiments, a signature may be calculatedbased on the contents of secure storage 120 and stored as a referencesignature. The integrity of the data stored in secure storage 120 maythen be validated at a later time by recalculating this signature of thecontents of the secure storage and comparing the recalculated signatureagainst the reference signature.

IHS 100 utilizes chipset 103 that may include one or more integratedcircuits that are coupled to processor(s) 101. In the embodiment of FIG.1, processor(s) 101 is depicted as a component of chipset 103. In otherembodiments, all of chipset 103, or portions of chipset 108 may beimplemented directly within the integrated circuitry of processor(s)101. Chipset 103 provides processor(s) 101 with access to a variety ofresources accessible via bus 102. In IHS 100, bus 102 is illustrated asa single element. However, other implementations may utilize any numberof buses to provide the illustrated pathways served by bus 102.

As illustrated, a variety of resources may be coupled to processor(s)101 of IHS 100 through chipset 103. For instance, chipset 103 may becoupled to network interface 109, such as provided by a NetworkInterface Controller (NIC) that is coupled to the IHS 100 and allows theIHS 100 to communicate via a network, such as the Internet or a LAN.Network interface device 109 may provide IHS 100 with wired and/orwireless network connections via a variety of network technologies, suchas wireless cellular or mobile networks (CDMA, TDMA, LTE etc.), WIFI andBLUETOOTH. In certain embodiments, network interface 109 may supportconnections between a trusted IHS component, such as trusted controller115, and a remote orchestration service. In such embodiments, aconnection supported by network interface 109 between the remoteorchestration service and the trusted component may be considered anout-of-band (OOB) connection that is isolated from the OS of the IHS.

Chipset 102 may also provide access to one or more display device(s) 108via graphics processor 107. In certain embodiments, graphics processor107 may be comprised within one or more video or graphics cards or anembedded controller installed as components of the IHS 100. Graphicsprocessor 107 may generate display information and provide the generatedinformation to one or more display device(s) 108 coupled to IHS 100,where display device(s) 108 may include integrated display devicesand/or external display devices coupled to IHS, such as via an I/O port116, where display device(s) 108 may include integrated display devicesand/or external display devices coupled to IHS. In certain embodiments,graphics processor 107 may be integrated within processor 101. The oneor more display devices 108 coupled to IHS 100 may utilize LCD, LED,OLED, or other thin film display technologies. Each display device 108may be capable of touch input such as via a touch controller that may bean embedded component of display device 108, graphics processor 107, ora separate component of IHS 100 accessed via bus 102.

In certain embodiments, chipset 103 may utilize one or more I/Ocontrollers to access hardware components such as user input devices 111and sensors 112. For instance, I/O controller 110 may provide access touser-input devices 110 such as a keyboard, mouse, touchpad, touchscreenand/or other peripheral input devices. User input devices 111 mayinterface with I/O controller 110 through wired or wireless connections.Sensors 112 accessed via I/O controllers 110 may provide access to datadescribing environmental and operating conditions of IHS 100 (e.g.,accelerometers, gyroscopes, hinge sensors, rotation sensors, hall effectsensors, temperature sensors, voltage sensors, current sensors, IRsensors, photosensors, proximity sensors, distance sensors, magneticsensors, microphones, ultrasonic sensors, etc.).

In some cases, chipset 103 may include a sensor hub capable of utilizinginformation collected by sensors 112 in determining the relativeorientation and movement of IHS 100. For instance, the sensor hub mayutilize inertial movement sensors, that may include accelerometer,gyroscope, and magnetometer sensors, and are capable of determining thecurrent orientation and movement of IHS 100 (e.g., IHS 100 is motionlesson a relatively flat surface, IHS 100 is being moved irregularly and islikely in transport, the hinge of IHS 100 is oriented in a verticaldirection). In certain embodiments, the sensor hub may also includecapabilities for determining a location and movement of IHS 100 based ontriangulation of network signal and based on network informationprovided by the OS or network interface 109. In some embodiments, thesensor hub may support additional sensors, such as optical, infrared andsonar sensors, that may provide support for xR (virtual, augmented,and/or mixed reality) sessions hosted by the IHS 100 and may be used bythe sensor hub provide an indication of a user's presence near IHS 100,such as whether a user is present, absent, and/or facing the integrateddisplay 108.

In cases where the end-user is present before IHS 100, the sensor hubmay further determine a distance of the end-user from the IHS, wherethis determination may be made continuously, at periodic intervals, orupon request. The detected or calculated distances may be used byprocessor 101 to classify the user as being in the IHS's near-field(user's position<threshold distance A), mid-field (threshold distanceA<user's position<threshold distance B, where B>A), or far-field (user'sposition>threshold distance C, where C>B). As described in additionaldetail below, the failure to detect an authenticated user of the IHS 100within a proximity of the IHS 100 may result in a change in the securityprofile of IHS 100, thus triggering a re-evaluation of the security riskof workspaces operating on IHS 100. Similar re-evaluation may betriggered based on the detection of additional individuals in proximityto IHS 100.

In embodiments where IHS 100 may support multiple physicalconfigurations, such as a convertible laptop, N-in-1 device, or thelike, the sensor hub may utilize one or more mode sensors 112 thatcollect readings that may be used in determining the current posture inwhich the IHS 100 is physically configured. In certain embodiments, suchposture determinations may be additionally made using the movement andorientation information provided by sensors 112. In laptop andconvertible laptop embodiments, for example, processor 101 or trustedcontroller 115 may utilize a lid position sensor 112 to determine therelative angle between the two panels of the laptop in order todetermine the mode in which IHS 100 is physically configured. In suchembodiments, the lid position sensor may measure the angle of rotationof the hinge that connects the base panel and lid panel of IHS 100. Insome embodiments, processor 101 or trusted controller 115 may providecollected lid position information, such as the hinge angle, to thesensor hub for use in determining the posture in which IHS 100 isconfigured. In some embodiments, the sensor hub may interface directlywith the lid position sensor in determining hinge angle information.

The sensor hub may determine the posture of IHS 100 based, at least inpart, on the angle of rotation of the hinge of IHS 100 from a closedposition. A first range of hinge angles from a closed position mayindicate a laptop posture, a second range of hinge angles may indicate alandscape posture and a third range of angles may indicate a tabletposture. The sensor hub may additionally utilize orientation andmovement information collected from inertial movement sensors 112 tofurther determine the posture in which the IHS 100 is physicallyconfigured. For instance, if the sensor hub determines that IHS 100 isconfigured with a hinge angle of a laptop configuration, but IHS 100 isoriented on its side, the IHS may be determined to be in a book mode. IfIHS 100 is determined to be tilted such that the hinge is orientedbetween horizontal and vertical, the user's face is detected to befacing the integrated display, and IHS 100 is experiencing slightmovement, the sensor hub may determine that the IHS 100 is being used ina book posture. The sensor hub may determine that IHS 100 is opened to a180-degree hinge angle and lies on a flat surface, thus indicating thatIHS 100 it is being used in a landscape posture. The sensor hub maysimilarly determine that IHS 100 is in a tent configuration, in responseto detecting a hinge angle within a defined range, such as between 300and 345 degrees, and also detecting an orientation of IHS 100 where thehinge is aligned horizontally and is higher than both of the displaypanels of IHS 100.

Other components of IHS 100 may include one or more I/O ports 116 forcommunicating with peripheral external devices as well as various inputand output devices. For instance, I/O 116 ports may include HDMI(High-Definition Multimedia Interface) ports for use in connectingexternal display devices to IHS 100 and USB (Universal Serial Bus)ports, by which a variety of external devices may be coupled to IHS 100.In some embodiments, external devices coupled to IHS 100 via an I/O port116 may include storage devices that support transfer of data to andfrom system memory 105 and/or storage devices 119 of IHS 100. Asdescribed in additional detail below, the coupling of storage devicesvia an I/O port 116 may result in a change in the security profile ofIHS 100, thus triggering a re-evaluation of the security risk ofworkspaces operating on IHS 100.

Chipset 103 also provides processor(s) 101 with access to one or morestorage devices 119. In various embodiments, storage device 119 may beintegral to the IHS 100, or may be external to the IHS 100. In certainembodiments, storage device 119 may be accessed via a storage controllerthat may be an integrated component of the storage device. Storagedevice 119 may be implemented using any memory technology allowing IHS100 to store and retrieve data. For instance, storage device 119 may bea magnetic hard disk storage drive or a solid-state storage drive. Insome embodiments, storage device 119 may be a system of storage devices,such as a cloud drive accessible via network interface 109.

As illustrated, IHS 100 also includes BIOS (Basic Input/Output System)117 that may be stored in a non-volatile memory accessible by chipset103 via bus 102. Upon powering or restarting IHS 100, processor(s) 101may utilize BIOS 117 instructions to initialize and test hardwarecomponents coupled to IHS 100. BIOS 117 instructions may also load anoperating system for use by IHS 100. BIOS 117 provides an abstractionlayer that allows the operating system to interface with the hardwarecomponents of the IHS 100. The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface(UEFI) was designed as a successor to BIOS. As a result, many modernIHSs utilize UEFI in addition to or instead of a BIOS. As used herein,BIOS is intended to also encompass UEFI.

In the illustrated embodiment, BIOS 117 includes a predefined memory ormemory region that may be referred to as NVM (Non-Volatile Memory)mailbox 106. In such an implementation, mailbox 106 may provide asecured storage location for use in storing workspace access policies,signatures, cryptographic keys or other data utilized to host andvalidate a workspace on IHS 100. In certain embodiments, the BIOSmailbox 106 may be utilized as a secure storage utilized by a remoteorchestration service in order to store access policies andcryptographic keys for use in delivering and deploying a securedcontainer on IHS 100. BIOS mailbox 106 and secured storage 120 in systemmemory 105 may be utilized in this manner instead of, or in conjunctionwith, out-of-band functions implemented by trusted controller 115.

In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 is coupled to IHS 100.For example, trusted controller 115 may be an embedded controller (EC)that is installed as a component of the motherboard of IHS 100. Invarious embodiments, trusted controller 115 may perform variousoperations in support of the delivery and deployment of a workspace toIHS 100. In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 may interoperatewith a remote orchestration service via an out-of-band communicationspathway that is isolated from the operating system that runs on IHS 100.Network interface 109 may support such out-of-band communicationsbetween trusted controller 115 and a remote orchestration service.

Trusted controller 115 may receive cryptographic information requiredfor secure delivery and deployment of a workspace to IHS 100. In suchembodiments, the cryptographic information may be stored to securedstorage 121 maintained by trusted controller 115. Additionally, oralternatively, trusted controller 115 may support execution of a trustedoperating environment that may support cryptographic operations used todeploy a workspace on IHS 100. Additionally, or alternatively, trustedcontroller 115 may support deployment of a workspace within the OS ofIHS 100 via an out-of-band communications channel that is isolated fromthe OS and allows the workspace to communicate with a trusted agentprocess of the OS.

Trusted controller 115 may also provide support for certaincryptographic processing used to support secure deployment and operationof workspaces on IHS 100. In some embodiments, such cryptographicprocessing may be provided via operations of a secure operatingenvironment hosted by trusted controller 115 in isolation from thesoftware and other hardware components of the IHS 100. In someembodiments, trusted controller 115 may rely on cryptographic processingprovided by dedicated cryptographic hardware supported by the IHS, suchas a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) microcontroller. In some embodiments,the secured storage 121 of trusted controller 115 may be utilized tostore cryptographic information for use in authorization of workspaces.

In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 may be additionallyconfigured to calculate signatures that uniquely identify individualcomponents of IHS 100. In such scenarios, trusted controller 115 maycalculate a hash value based on the configuration of a hardware and/orsoftware component coupled to IHS 100. For instance, trusted controller115 may calculate a hash value based on all firmware and other code orsettings stored in an onboard memory of a hardware component, such as anetwork interface 109. Such hash values may be calculated as part of atrusted process of manufacturing IHS 100 and may be maintained in thesecure storage 121 as a reference signature.

Trusted controller 115 may be further configured to recalculate a hashvalue at a later time for such a component. The hash value recalculatedfor the component may then be compared against the reference hash valuesignature in order to determine if any modifications have been made to acomponent, thus indicating the component has been compromised. In thismanner, trusted controller 115 may be used to validate the integrity ofhardware and software components installed on IHS 100. In certainembodiments, remote orchestration service 206 may verify the integrityof the trusted controller 115 in the same manner, by calculating asignature of trusted controller 115 and comparing it to a referencesignature calculated during a trusted process for manufacture of IHS100. In various embodiments, one or more of these operations supportedby trusted controller 115 may be implemented using BIOS 117.

Trusted controller 115 may also implement operations for interfacingwith a power adapter in managing power for IHS 100. Such operations maybe utilized to determine the power status of IHS 100, such as whetherIHS 100 is operating from battery power or is plugged into an AC powersource. Firmware instructions utilized by trusted controller 115 may beused to operate a secure execution environment that may includeoperations for providing various core functions of IHS 100, such aspower management and management of certain operating modes of IHS 100(e.g., turbo modes, maximum operating clock frequencies of certaincomponents, etc.).

In managing operating modes of IHS 100, trusted controller 115 mayimplement operations for detecting certain changes to the physicalconfiguration of IHS 100 and managing the modes corresponding todifferent physical configurations of IHS 100. For instance, where IHS100 is a laptop computer or a convertible laptop computer, trustedcontroller 115 may receive inputs from a lid position sensor 112 thatmay detect whether the two sides of the laptop have been latchedtogether to a closed position. In response to lid position sensor 112detecting latching of the lid of IHS 100, trusted controller 115 mayinitiate operations for shutting down IHS 100 or placing IHS 100 in alow-power mode.

IHS 100 may support the use of various power modes. In some embodiments,the power modes of IHS 100 may be implemented through operations oftrusted controller 115 and/or the OS of IHS 100. In various embodiments,IHS 100 may support various reduced power modes in order to reduce powerconsumption and/or conserve battery power when IHS 100 is not activelyin use, and/or to control a level of performance available to the userby increasing or decreasing a maximum operating clock frequency of acomponent of IHS 100 (e.g., processor(s) 101).

In some embodiments, an IHS 100 may not include all of the componentsshown in FIG. 1. In other embodiments, an IHS 100 may include othercomponents in addition to those that are shown in FIG. 1. Furthermore,some components that are represented as separate components in FIG. 1may instead be integrated with other components. For example, in certainembodiments, all or a portion of the operations executed by theillustrated components may instead be provided by components integratedinto processor(s) 101 as systems-on-a-chip.

FIG. 2 is a diagram depicting an example of method 200 for securing adynamic workspace in an enterprise productivity ecosystem. For sake ofillustration, method 200 has been split into three phases: workspaceinitialization phase 200A, workspace orchestration phase 200B, andworkspace termination phase 200C. During initialization 200A, user 201(e.g., an enterprise user) operates an IHS 100 (e.g., a desktop, alaptop, a tablet, a smart phone, etc.) such as described with regard toFIG. 1 within physical environment 202 (e.g., any type of environmentand its associated context, including physical location, geographiclocation, location within a particular facility or building, detectednetworks, time of day, proximity of the user, individuals in thevicinity of IHS 100, etc.).

Method 200 starts with an action by user 201 at a launch point 203 thatmay be, for example, a corporate launch point provided by an employer ofuser 201, a launch point 203 provided by the manufacturer of IHS 100, ora launch point provided as a service to user 201 by a third-party.Particularly, user 201 operates IHS 100 to access launch point 203 thatis provided, for example, in the form of a web portal, a portalapplication running in the operating system of IHS 100, aspecial-purpose portal workspace operating on IHS 100, or the like. Invarious implementations, launch point 203 may include Graphical UserInterface (GUI) elements representing different software applications,data sources and/or other resources that the user may desire to executeand/or manipulate. In various embodiments, launch point may provide agraphical, textual and/or audio interface by which data or otherresource may be requested by a user 201. As such, an authenticated user201 may be provided a launch point that provides visibility as to one ormore software applications and an aggregation of user's data sourcesavailable across all of their datastores (e.g., local storage, cloudstorage, etc.).

As described in additional detail below, workspaces for providing user201 with access to requested data or other resources may operate using alocal management agent 332 that operates on IHS 100 and is configured tointeroperate with workspace orchestration service 206. In variousembodiments, launch point 203 may be provided in the form of a portal(e.g., a webpage, OS application or special purpose workspace) thatallows user 201 to request access to managed resources. In variousembodiments, launch point 203 may be hosted by remote workspaceorchestration service 206, local management agent 332 on IHS 100, or anysuitable combination thereof. Examples of launch point 203 technologiesmay include WORKSPACE ONE INTELLIGENT HUB from WMWARE, INC., and DELLHYBRID CLIENT from DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., among others.

Initialization phase 200A begins when user 201 chooses to launch anapplication or access a data source managed by the workspaceorchestration service 206. In response to an access request issued byuser 201 (e.g., the user “clicks” on an icon of launch point 203), localmanagement agent 332 of IHS 100 collects initial security andproductivity context information at 204. As described in additionaldetail with regard to FIG. 4, the security context information mayinclude attributes indicating a security risk associated with: the dataand/or application being requested, a level of risk presented by theuser 201, the hardware utilized by the IHS 100, the logical environmentof IHS 100 in which a workspace will be deployed to provide access tothe requested data and/or application, and the physical environment 202in which IHS 100 is currently located.

Accordingly, in this disclosure, the term “security context” generallyrefers to data or other information related to a security posture inwhich a workspace will be deployed and utilized, where the securityposture may be based on the user, IHS 100, data to be accessed via theworkspace, and/or environment 202. As described in additional detailwith regard to FIGS. 4 and 5, a security context may be quantified as asecurity risk score in support of evaluations of the level or riskassociated with providing user 201 access to requested data and/orapplication while using IHS 100 in the particular context. A “securityrisk score” generally refers to a numerical value usable to score,quantify, or measure various security characteristics of the securitycontext associated with a request. A risk score may be an aggregatescore associated with the overall security risk context, whereas a “riskmetric” may be a measurement of risk for a sub-category of some part ofthe security context.

As described in additional detail with regard to FIGS. 4 and 5, securitymetrics that may be used in the calculation of a security risk score fora particular security context may include, but are not limited to: aclassification of the requested data source and/or application,authentication factors used to identify user 201, the location of IHS100, a role or other group classifications associated with user 201,validation of networks in use by IHS 100, type of network in use by IHS100, network firewall configurations in use by IHS 100, indicators ofattack (IoA), indicators of compromise (IoC) regarding IHS 100 or aresource being requested by user 201, patch levels associated with theoperating system and other applications in use on IHS 100, availabilityof encryption, type of available encryption, access to secured storage,use of attestable hardware by IHS 100, supported degree of workspaceisolation by IHS 100, etc.

The term “productivity context” generally refers to user productivityassociated with a workspace, user, IHS, or environment. A “productivityscore” generally refers to an index usable to score, quantify, ormeasure various productivity characteristics of a productivity context.Examples of productivity context information include, but are notlimited to: the hardware of the IHS, the software of the IHS, includingthe operating system, power states and maximum clock frequencies ofselected components of the IHS, peripheral devices coupled to the IHS,either permanently or temporarily, networks available to the IHS and theperformance characteristics of those networks, software installersavailable on the IHS, etc.

Initial productivity and security targets for a workspace may becalculated based on the context of user's 201 actions combined with theproductivity and security context in which the workspace will operate.The productivity and security targets may also be based on user's 201behavioral analytics, IHS 100 telemetry and/or environmental information(e.g., collected via sensors 112). In some cases, at 205, a localmanagement agent operating on IHS 100 may calculate initial security andproductivity targets based upon the collected security and productivitycontext. In other cases, remote workspace orchestration service 206 maycalculate security and productivity targets.

As used herein, the term “security target” generally refers to theattack surface presented by a workspace that is created and operatedbased on a workspace definition, while the term “productivity target”generally refers to the productivity characteristics of a particularworkspace definition. Examples of a productivity target include, but arenot limited to: type of data or data source available to user 201,minimum latency of a workspace, etc. Conversely, attributes that may beused to characterize a security target may include, but are not limitedto: a minimum security score for a workspace, a minimum trust score ofIHS 100, authentication requirements for user 201 (e.g., how manyauthentication factors are required, frequency of reauthentication),minimum level of trust in the network utilized by a workspace, requiredisolation of a workspace from IHS 100, the ability to access browserwithin a workspace, the ability to transfer data between workspaces, theability to extend a workspace, etc.

Moreover, the term “workspace definition” generally refers to acollection of attributes that describe aspects a workspace that may beassembled, created, and deployed in a manner that satisfies a securitytarget (i.e., the definition presents an attack surface that presents anacceptable level of risk) and a productivity target (e.g., data access,access requirements, upper limits on latency, etc.) in light of thesecurity context (e.g., location, patch level, threat information,network connectivity, etc.) and the productivity context (e.g.,available device type and performance, network speed, etc.) in which theworkspace is to be deployed. A workspace definition may enable fluidityof migration of an instantiated workspace, since the definition supportsthe ability for a workspace to be assembled on any target OS or IHS thatis configured for operation with the workspace orchestration service206.

In describing capabilities and constraints of a workspace, a workspacedefinition 208 may prescribe one or more of: authentication requirementsfor user 201, containment and/or isolation of the workspace (e.g., localapplication, sandbox, docker container, progressive web application or“PWA,” Virtual Desktop Infrastructure “VDI,” etc.), primary applicationsthat can be executed in the defined containment of the workspace toenable user 201 to be productive with one or more data sources,additional applications that enhance productivity, security componentsthat reduce the scope of the security target presented by theproductivity environment (DELL DATA GUARDIAN from DELL TECHNOLOGIESINC., an anti-virus, etc.), the data sources to be accessed andrequirements for routing that data to and from the workspace containment(e.g., use of VPN, minimum encryption strength), workspace capabilitiesto independently attach other resources; etc.

In some implementations, workspace definitions may be based at least inpart on static policies or rules defined, for example, by anenterprise's Information Technology (IT) personnel. In someimplementations, static rules may be combined and improved upon bymachine learning (ML) and/or artificial intelligence (AI) algorithmsthat evaluate historical productivity and security data collected asworkspaces are life cycled. In this manner, rules may be dynamicallymodified over time to generate improved workspace definitions. If it isdetermined, for instance, that a user dynamically adds a text editorevery time he uses MICROSOFT VISUAL STUDIO from MICROSOFT CORPORATION,then workspace orchestration service 206 may autonomously add thatapplication to the default workspace definition for that user.

Still with respect to FIG. 2, during orchestration 200B, the initialsecurity and productivity targets are processed and/or reconciledagainst resources, device capabilities, and cloud services available,etc., to produce a workspace definition at 208. As described, aworkspace definition may specify capabilities and constraints of aworkspace, such as: runtime security requirements of the workspacecontainment (e.g., such as isolation from the OS of IHS 100 or fromcertain hardware of IHS 100), the use of reference measurements toattest to the integrity of the workspace once running, applications tobe provided for operation within the workspace, aggregation of resourcesavailable via the workspace, access configurations (e.g., virtualprivate network or “VPN”), etc.

The initial workspace definition may then then be utilized by automationengine 302 of workspace orchestration service 206 to coordinate theassembly 209 and instantiation 210 of a workspace on an appropriateplatform—e.g., on the cloud or on IHS 201—based on the security andproductivity contexts in which the workspace will operate. In caseswhere a workspace is cloud-hosted, the automation engine 302 mayassemble and instantiate a remote workspace that may be accessed via asecure connection established via a web browser or other web-basedcomponent operating on the IHS 100. In some embodiments, automationengine 302 may resolve configuration conflicts between a workspacedefinition and the user's inputs in the operation of a workspace.

The instantiated workspace is operated by user 201 at 211, and newproductivity and security context information related to the behavior oruse of data is generated at 212. This operation of a workspace mayresult in a change or new classification of data based upon what user201 has done, accessed, and/or created, thus resulting in a change tothe security context of the workspace. To the extent the user'sbehavioral analytics, device telemetry, and/or the environment haschanged to a quantifiable degree, these changes in security context mayserve as additional input for a reevaluation of the security andperformance targets at 207 by automation engine 302. Additionally, oralternatively, new workspace context, security target, and/orproductivity target may be now measured against the initial targets, andthe result may cause automation engine 302 to produce a new workspacedefinition at 208, if appropriate.

Particularly, if the instantiated workspace(s) have parameters that falloutside of the range of the target indexes such that a differencebetween additional or updated context information and the initial orprevious context information is scored below a threshold value,automation engine 302 may process the assembly of modifications to anexisting workspace and deploy such modifications at 210. Conversely, ifthe difference between the additional or updated context information andthe initial or previous context information is scored above a thresholdvalue, automation engine 302 may generate a new workspace at 210.Session data metadata and context may be preserved by data aggregationengine 336, and session data may be restored as applicable.

Additionally, or alternatively, method 200 may terminate or retire theinitial or previous workspace at 213, as part of termination phase 200C.In some cases, user action may initiate the termination process (e.g.,user 201 closes application or browser accessing data) and/ortermination may take place automatically as part of an adjustment inworkspace definition (e.g., the isolated environment is instructed toterminate by automation engine 302). Still as part of termination phase200C, workspace resources of IHS 100 and/or at workspace orchestrationservice 206 may be released.

As such, in various embodiments, method 200 enables secure userproductivity even when a workspace operates on an IHS or cloud platformthat is not under direct management. Method 200 also provides fordynamic or adaptive configurations and policies allowing for the bestpossible user experience while maintaining appropriate level ofsecurity. In some cases, the definition of a productivity environmentand access requirements may be selected based upon productivity andsecurity dependencies and targets, and the definition of capabilitiesrelated to the workspace may be adaptive in nature. Particularly,workspace definition attributes may be dynamically selected based uponhistorical productivity and security information, based upon eachindividual user or group's behavior.

FIGS. 3A and 3B show a diagram of an example of system components 300Aand 300B (collectively referred to as “system 300”) configured tomodernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem. Particularly, component system 300A comprisesworkspace orchestration service 206, and it may include one or more IHSsremotely located and/or networked having program instructions storedthereon that, upon execution, cause the one or more IHSs to performvarious workspace orchestration operations described herein, including,but not limited to: the dynamic evaluation of security and productivitytargets based upon updated context information received from IHS 100,the calculation of risk scores and other productivity and securitymetrics based on ongoing collection of context information, thegeneration of workspace definitions, and the assembly of one or morefiles or policies that enable the instantiation of a workspace inaccordance with a workspace definition at a cloud service and/or IHS300B.

Component 300B includes IHS 100 may have program instructions storedthereon that, upon execution, cause IHS 100 to perform various localmanagement operations described herein, including, but not limited to,the collection of productivity and security context information, thecalculation of productivity scores and/or risk scores, theinstantiation, execution, and modification of a workspace based uponfiles or policies, such as workspace definitions, received fromworkspace orchestration service 206, etc.

Workspace orchestration service 300A and IHS 300B may be coupled to eachother via any suitable network technology and/or protocol, which allowsworkspace orchestration service 300A to be remotely provided withrespect to IHS 300B. As described with regard to FIG. 1, an IHSaccording to embodiments may include a component such as a trustedcontroller that may support certain secure out-of-band communicationsthat are independent from the operating system of IHS 100. In someembodiments, such a trusted controller may be configured to supportdeployment and operation of workspaces on 300A and to report changes incontext information to the workspace orchestration service 300A.

As illustrated in component 300A of FIG. 3A, workspace orchestrationservice 206 may include a number of sub-components that supportdeployment and ongoing evaluation and adaptation of workspaces on an IHS300B. Embodiments of the workspace orchestration service 300A mayinclude systems that may support: web services 306, manufacturerintegration 317, and analytics 323. Moreover, web services 306 maycomprise application services 301 and user interface (UI) and automationservices 302.

Analytics services 323 may be configured to receive and process contextinformation from IHS 300B, both during initial configuration of aworkspace and in ongoing support of workspaces, and to provide thatinformation, along with any analytics generated, to context logic 303 ofapplication services 301. Based on information collected during thedeployment and ongoing support of workspaces, support assistanceintelligence engine (SAIE) 324 may be configured to generate and/oranalyze technical support information (e.g., updates, errors, supportlogs, etc.) for use in diagnosing and repairing workspace issues.Workspace insights and telemetry engine 325 may be configured to analyzeand/or produce device-centric, historical, and behavior-based data(e.g., hardware measurements, use of features, settings, etc.) resultingfrom the operation of workspaces. Workspace intelligence 326 may includeany suitable intelligence engine for processing and evaluating contextdata in order to identify patterns and tendencies in the operation ofworkspaces and in the adaptation of workspaces based on context changes.

As illustrated, an application services 306 system of the workspaceorchestration service 300A includes an UI and automation services 302system that may include context logic or engine 303, classificationpolicy 304, and condition control module or engine 305. Context logic orengine 303 may support processing of context information in making riskassessments (e.g., evaluating the risk associated requests by the useragainst the context of the user's behavior, history of the user's IHS,capabilities of the user's IHS, and environmental conditions). Forinstance, as described with regard to FIGS. 4 and 5, security contextinformation collected by IHS 300B may be provided to workspaceorchestration service 300A where it may be used, such as by contextlogic 303, to calculate a risk score associated with a request for useof a managed data source and/or application. Classification policy 304may include administrator and machine-learning defined policiesdescribing risk classifications associated with different securitycontexts, such as risk classifications for specific data, locations,environments, IHS s, logical environments, or user actions (e.g., use ofhigh-risk data requires use of a workspace definition suitable for usewith a risk score above a specific value). Condition control module orengine 305 may include intelligence providing automated decision makingfor appropriately aligning risk and context. In some cases, conditioncontrol module or engine 305 may dynamically deploy a solution toaddress any detected misalignment of risk and context. For instance,upon requesting access to a highly classified data source that resultsin a significant increase in risk score, the condition control enginemay select workspace definition modifications that implement securityprocedures that are suitable for the higher risk score.

Application services 301 may include a group of web services 306 calledon by UI and automation services 302 to support various aspects of theorchestration of workspaces. Particularly, web services 306 may includeapplication and workspace services 307 that may assemble and packageapplications for deployment in a workspace (e.g., an “.msix” filepackaged and deployed to a MICROSOFT HYPER-V container). In someembodiments, a workspace definition may be used to specify whether auser will be provided access to an application in this manner. Webservices 306 may also include a tenant subscription module 308, thatperforms dynamic configuration of an IHS and deployment of the describedworkspace orchestration services at the point-of-sale (POS) of an IHS. Alicense tracking module 309 may be used to maintain and track licenseinformation for software, services, and IHSs. An access control module310 may provide top level access controls used in controlling access todata and applications by authorized users. A Unified Endpoint Management(UEM) module 311 may be configured to support the describedorchestration of workspaces on various different IHSs that may beutilized by a particular user.

Web services 306 that may be used in support of workspaces may furtherinclude resource provisioning services 312 for configuring an IHS orworkspace with secrets/credentials necessary to access specificresources (e.g., credentials for use of VPNs, networks, data storagerepositories, workspace encryption, workspace attestation, andworkspace-to-device anchoring). In some cases, resource provisioningservices 312 may include secrets provisioned as part of a trustedassembly process of IHS 300B and, in some instances, associated with aunique identifier 348 of the IHS 300B. Web services 306 may also includean authorization/token module that provides identity functions and mayconnect to various authentication sources, such as, for example, ActiveDirectory. Endpoint registration module 314 may be configured toregister IHSs and/or workspaces with management service that tracks theuse of the described workspace orchestration. In some scenarios, adirectory services 315 module may be configured to provide activedirectory services (e.g., AZURE ACTIVE DIRECTORY from MICROSOFTCORPORATION). Device configuration services 316 enable centralconfiguration, monitoring, managing, and optimization of workspaces thatin certain contexts may operate remotely from an IHS and may onlypresent the user of the IHS with an image of the workspace output. Incooperation with resource provisioning services 312, deviceconfiguration services 316 may also handle secret creation and IHSconfiguration, and it some cases, may be out-of-band capable and handleselected operations to the endpoint.

Still referring to FIG. 3A, manufacturer integration components 317communicate with application services 301 and client IHS 300B to providefeatures that are usable during workspace evaluation and instantiation,where these features are based upon information available to themanufacturer of client IHS 300B. For instance, certificate authority 318may include an entity that issues digital certificates that may be usedin validating the authenticity and integrity of the hardware of IHS300B. Identity service module or engine 319 may be configured to managethe user's or owner's identity as well as brokering identification foruse of customer directory 322. Order entitlement module or engine 320may be responsible for managing the entitlements purchased as well asthe associated issued certificates signed by 318. Ownership repository321 may manage user entitlements associated with IHSs and theirownership and may provide support for users transferring ownership of anIHS and conveying the entitlements associated with that IHS. In certainscenarios, ownership repository 321 may use this transfer of ownershipto decommission the secrets associated with the entitlements embedded inthe IHS. Customer directory 322 may be configured to authenticate andauthorize all users and IHSs in a network, such as assigning andenforcing security policies for all IHSs and installing or updatingsoftware (in some cases, customer directory 322 may work in cooperationand/or may be the same as directory services 315).

Referring now to IHS 300B of FIG. 3B, in some embodiments, IHS 300B maybe configured to operate a local management agent 332 that may runwithin a secure execution environment 345 hosted by a trusted controller341, such as trusted controller 115 of FIG. 1. In other embodiments, thelocal management agent 332 may operate as a trusted and attestableprocess of the operating system of IHS 300B. In some embodiments, localmanagement agent 332 may include a workspace engine suitable forinstantiating and managing the operation of one or more workspaces331A-N on IHS 300B. As described, the capabilities of a workspace may bemodified based on changes in the productivity and security contexts inwhich the workspace is operating. Accordingly, the workload(s) in eachof the workspaces 331A-N may be hosted in a public cloud, a privatecloud, a specific server, or locally hosted on IHS 300B, depending onthe context in which the workspace is operating. These allocations ofworkspace computing for each particular workspace 331A-N may beprescribed by the workspace definition that is used to build and operateeach workspace. As described, the workspace definition may be created byworkspace orchestration service 206 based upon context informationprovided by IHS 300B, security targets for each workspace 331A-N, andproductivity targets for each workspace 331A-N.

In some embodiments, local management agent 332 may be configured tohost, launch, and/or execute a workspace hub 327 that provides a launchpoint 203 by which user's initiate workspaces through the selection ofmanaged data and resources. In various embodiments, launch point 203 maybe an agent, application, special-purpose workspace or web portal theprovides an interface by which a user may select from an aggregatedcollection of data sources, applications, calendars, messages or othermanaged information or resources that are available to the user of IHS300B via operation of a workspace as described herein. In variousembodiments, the launch point 203 may be provided in the form fortextual, graphical and/or audio user interfaces that allow a user of IHS300B to select available data and/or resources. In some embodiments,workspace hub 327 may utilize a local environment management module 328in providing the workspace interface that is presented to the user onIHS 300B and doing so in a consistent manner across workspaces 331A-N.Workspace hub 327 may also include a local intelligence logic or engine329 used to support modeling the use of IHS 300B in order to improvecharacterization of the actual risk associated with a risk context. Userauthentication and access control operations may be performed by a localidentify module 330 that may interface with trusted controller 341 inproviding user authentication.

In some cases, each instantiated workspace 331A-N may be an environmentthat provides a user with access to requested data or applications,where the environment may be isolated in varying degrees from thehardware and software of IHS 300B based on the security context andproductivity context in which each workspace 331A-N is operating. Insome instances, the selection of a data source or resource that areavailable to user via launch point 203 may result in launching a newworkspace. For instance, if a user launches a browser through selectionof an icon displayed by launch point 203, a new workspace may be createdand launched according to a workspace definition that has been selectedfor providing the user access to a web browser in the security andproductivity contexts in which the request has been made. In a scenariowhere the user double clicks on a confidential presentation fileavailable from a data source that is provided by launch point 203, anadditional workspace may be instantiated with a presentation applicationproviding access to the requested presentation file, where this newworkspace is created based on a workspace definition that providedappropriate security for access to the confidential presentation). Inother instances, a selection of the presentation file by a user mayresult in the presentation being made available through the existingworkspace, in some cases using the existing workspace definition and, inother cases, using a workspace definition that has been modified tosupport the requested access to the confidential presentation file.

Although workspaces 331A-N supported by IHS 330B may each be isolated tovarying degrees from the hardware and/or software of IHS 300B and fromeach other, a user of IHS 330B may expect to be able to operate themultiple workspaces 331A-N in a manner that allows content to betransferred between the different workspaces 331A-N. For instance, auser may select a portion of the data displayed in workspace 331A andutilize operating system or other workspace functions to copy the datafor copying to workspace 331B.

In various embodiments, a local management agent 332 may operate in fullor in part on a secure platform 345 hosted by trusted controller 341that operates independent from the operating system of IHS 300B. In someembodiments, all or part of local management agent 332 may operate astrusted components of the operating system of IHS 300B. To execute thevarious operations described herein, local management agent 332 mayinclude a command monitor 334 configured to provide instrumentation toreceive commands from workspace orchestration service 300A and thusenable access to IHS 300B. Local management agent 332 may also includetelemetry module 335 that may be configured for communicating collectedinformation to the workspace orchestration service 300A, includingreporting changes in context that may warrant adjustments to workspaces331A-N. Data aggregator 336 may track all of the data source and otherresources (e.g., applications, local or cloud-based services) that maybe provided to the user via a workspace.

Local management agent 332 may utilize a resource manager module 337that is configured to manage access to data, network configuration, suchas for VPNs and network access, identity information, access control,and resource provisioning services. Security module 338 may beconfigured to provide various security services. BIOS interface 339 mayprovide a secure BIOS interface used for accessing and managingcredentials in secure object storage. A BIOS analytics module 340 may beconfigured to perform forensic services for BIOS telemetry and healthassessments. Persistence module 346 may be configured to supportpersistence of applications entitled at a POS or assigned byadministrators and supported with required license tracking. Workspaceattestation module 333 may provide a platform centric service layer ontop of a container engine provided by local management agent 332 and maybe used to measure and attest workspaces 331A-N in any suitable mannerdefined or orchestrated by condition control 305.

As part of secure platform 345, native management module 347 may beconfigured to enable out-of-band management interface with workspaceorchestration service 206, where this OOB interface operates independentform the OS of IHS 300B. In some embodiments, the OOB managementinterface supported by native management module 347 may be utilized bythe device configuration services 316 of the workspace orchestrationservice to access the secure platform services 345 of IHS 300B.

Digital device ID module 348 may provide a unique, unspoofable,cryptographically bound identifier. In embodiments supporting a secureplatform 345, secure embedded controller 341 may be a hardened hardwaremodule that may include a root of trust module 342 configured as atrusted data store and, in some cases for cryptographic processing, thatmay be trusted within a cryptographic system. A device attestationservice 343 may be configured to perform device assurance and trustservices (e.g., secure BIOS and secure boot, etc.). A secure objectstore 344 may be provided that is configured to lock and access keys,hashes, and/or other secrets in an EC and/or trusted platform module(TPM).

In some scenarios, IHS 100 may be provisioned by a manufacturer thatalso controls manufacturer integration components 317, workspaceattestation module 333 may operate in conjunction with secure objectstore 342, authenticated BIOS module 339, and/or digital device identitymodule 348, etc., to further secure and/or control productivity featuresavailable in any of workspaces 331A-N based upon hardware devices andsettings unique to that IHS and/or designed specifically by thatmanufacturer.

To further illustrate how the systems and methods described hereinoperate to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management in anenterprise productivity ecosystem, three non-limiting use-cases orexamples are discussed in turn below.

Use-Case A

In use-case A, a given user may request access to a protected datasource on the enterprise's premise using a corporate-owned and imagednotebook, such configured as described with regard to IHS 100 of FIG. 1and client IHS 300B of FIG. 3.

In response to the request, a local management agent 332 operating onthe user's notebook retrieves information describing the current contextand calculates security and productivity targets based on the determinedcontext. In this use-case, the local management agent may have beeninstalled by IT, and it may be running in the background as a service.The confidential data may be associated with the local management agenton the local machine, based on file classification (e.g., filemetadata/type/properties/permissions, folder location, encrypted region,etc.). Moreover, the local management agent may continuously collectcurrent context information and send it to the orchestration service foruse in scoring the risk and productivity of the workspace (this may alsobe done at the time of the user's access request or indication ofintent).

When the user selects the confidential data, such as via a selection viathe OS of the notebook, the local management agent notifies theworkspace orchestration service of the request and for a workspacedefinition for a workspace by which the user may be provided access tothe confidential data.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “2,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also given as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 1 (safe locale); userpersona: 1 (known high-confidence in a reasonably sophisticated userclassification—a user whom historically does not click on phishingemails); network risk: 1 (low risk because of on premise, wiredconnection detected); device risk: 1 (high level of control because ofcorporate owned/managed platform, known versions, security featuresenabled, etc.); regulatory: 1 (based on user, data, locationcombinations—e.g., No restrictions with respect to General DataProtection Regulation or “GDPR,” Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act “HIPAA,” Payment Card Industry “PCI,” technologyexport, etc.); and data type: 8 (a confidential datafile is beingrequested).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “9,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the following contextinformation or inputs, each of which is also given as a resource metricbased upon a selected policy: locale: 10 (office); user persona: 9 (a“skilled” classification based upon advanced compute tasks, proficiency,and/or speed); network speed/latency: 10 (fast, wired, Gigabit Ethernet,or direct to internal network); device performance: 8 (fast, expensiveCPU, memory, graphics, but storage only needs—e.g., <10 GB); and datatype: 10 (the local, confidential file is easy to read/write with lowlatency and high performance on local storage).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, the security target may be deemed to have a value of“1” based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads,needs, or demands on security controls and containment features that mayinclude: threat monitoring: 1 (low demand); threat detection: 1 (lowdemand); threat analytics: 1 (low demand); threat response: 1 (lowdemand); storage confidentiality: 2 (low); storage integrity: 2 (low);network confidentiality: 1 (low); network integrity: 1 (low); memoryconfidentiality: 1 (low); memory integrity: 1 (low); displayconfidentiality: 1 (low); display integrity: 1 (low); userauthentication: 1 (low, basic password is fine, non-multifactorauthentication or “MFA,” no session expiration); IT administrator scope:1 (administrator manages remotely but does not need heavy remediationsoftware; and regulatory compliance: 1 (no GDPR, No HIPAA, no PCI, notech export restriction, etc.).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “9” (defining a high-quality, responsive user experience) basedupon a combination of attribute values representing productivityrequirements as follows: local storage: 7 (partial hard drive control,some storage reserved for IT load); CPU access: 10 (unlimited); localgraphics: 10 (unlimited); and application stack: 10 (can useapplications, install applications that the user needs, give themadministrator rights, etc.).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and the local management agent may assemble theworkspace and instantiate it for the user. For example, the localmanagement agent may receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.)from the orchestration service, and it may parse the file to implementsecurity risk controls such as: threat monitoring: 1 (local managementagent does not install threat, detection, and response or “TDR”software); threat detection: 1 (local management agent does not installTDR software); threat analytics: 1 (orchestration does not need togather detailed telemetry from the system, OS will not be enrolled inlogging); threat response: 1 (local management agent does not installsecurity threat response agent); storage confidentiality: 2 (localmanagement agent deploys a local file-system encryption product that theuser can optionally enable on specific files as needed with right-clickcontext menus); storage integrity: 2; network confidentiality: 1 (localmanagement agent confirms basic firewall configuration is correct—e.g.,IT GPO-controlled); network integrity: 1; memory confidentiality: 1(local management agent confirms configuration—e.g., No SGX, TXT, orcontainer/sandbox software deployed); memory integrity: 1; displayconfidentiality: 1 (local management agent confirms graphics driversinstalled, privacy screen and camera optionally managed by user);display integrity: 1; user authentication: 1 (local agent confirms basicGPO password rules are configured, and met by user—e.g., number ofcharacters, no session expiration, etc.); IT administrator scope: 1(local agent runs with system privilege, confirms IT admin accounts arelisted in local admin user group—e.g., per GPO); and regulatorycompliance: 1 (local agent does not install any compliance assistancesoftware).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedlocal confidential file, and the user may begin working in a newlycreated workspace.

Use-Case B

In use-case B, a user may request access to a confidential datafilewhile at a coffee shop using an open public network and anIT-managed/owned PC, such configured as described with regard to IHS 100of FIG. 1 and client IHS 300B of FIG. 3.

First, a local management agent (332) executed by a client IHS (300B)retrieves the requested context and calculates security and productivityscores based on context. In this use-case, the local management agentmay have been installed by IT, and it may be running in the backgroundas a service. The confidential data may be kept on a shared IT-managednetwork resource on-premises (e.g., back in a main corporate office),and the local management agent may be responsible for monitoring whenthis data path is requested by the user (e.g., the user hits a specificURL, IP, etc.). Moreover, the local management agent may continuouslycollect all current context and send it to the workspace orchestrationservice to assist in scoring processes later (this may also be done atthe time of the user's access request or indication of intent, ratherthan a continuous collection).

When the user selects the desired confidential datafile, the client IHS(300B)'s OS calls the local management agent associated with the path tothe confidential datafile and calls back to a remote workspaceorchestration service (206) to request a workspace definition.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “4,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also given as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 5 (public, safe country);user persona: 5 (new user, classification data does not exist yet);network risk: 5 (medium, public but common location, wireless connectiondetected); device risk: 1 (high level of control, corporateowned/managed platform, known versions, security features enabled,etc.); and regulatory: 1 (based on user, data, locationcombinations—e.g., no restrictions with respect to General DataProtection Regulation or “GDPR,” Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act “HIPAA,” Payment Card Industry “PCI,” technologyexport, etc.).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “5,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon context information orinputs, each of which is also given as a resource metric based upon aselected policy. For instance, security contexts inputs may include:locale: 6 (remote location but in USA major city, in a public area,non-employees are within visual/audio range of device); user persona: 5(unknown confidence “null” classification, uses default onboardingassumptions); network speed/latency: 4 (medium, wireless but AC onshared network); and device performance: 8 (fast, expensive CPU, memory,graphics, but storage only needs ˜<10 GB).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, a security target may be deemed to have a value of “4”based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads, needs,or demands on security controls and containment features as follows:threat monitoring: 4 (medium demand); threat detection: 4 (mediumdemand); threat analytics: 4 (medium demand); threat response: 4 (mediumdemand); storage confidentiality: 4 (medium); storage integrity: 9(high); network confidentiality: 5 (medium); network integrity: 2 (low);memory confidentiality: 4 (medium); memory integrity: 8 (high); displayconfidentiality: 7 (medium/high—worried about “shoulder surfers” readingdata from an adjacent seat or table nearby, public location) displayintegrity: 2 (low); user authentication: 4 (medium, two-factorauthentication using a hardware token, session expiration upon sleep,screen lock, or logout); IT administration scope: 3 (administrator canmonitor, manage, and remediate remotely if the user calls them for helpwith IT issues); and regulatory compliance: 1 (no GDPR, No HIPAA, noPCI, no tech export restriction, etc.).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “7” (defining a high-quality, responsive user experience) basedupon a combination of attribute values representing productivityrequirements as follows: local storage: 7 (partial hard drive control,some storage reserved for IT load); CPU access: 10 (unlimited); localgraphics: 10 (unlimited); and application stack: 7 (can useapplications, can install some IT-approved applications that the userneeds, but no administrator rights, because the user cannot be trustedto install only valid/safe productivity software, but can installpre-approved IT applications as needed).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and the local management agent may assemble theworkspace and instantiate it for the user. For example, the localmanagement agent may receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.)from the orchestration service, and it may parse the file to implementsecurity risk controls such as: threat monitoring: 5 (local managementagent installs or confirms prior installation/configuration of TDRsoftware); threat detection: 5 (local management agent installs orconfirms prior installation/configuration of TDR software); threatanalytics: 5 (orchestration confirms telemetry is accessible, OS will beenrolled in logging if not already enrolled); threat response: 2 (localmanagement agent downloads but does not run remote incident responseapplication—preparation in case incident is detected); storageconfidentiality: 5 (local management agent deploys a local containertechnology, such as sandbox, with restricted “save” permissions suchthat the confidential files will not be allowed to save locally on thePC, but can be accessed as long as the session is active in memory);storage integrity: 5; network confidentiality: 5 (local management agentsteps up firewall protections, disabling all unnecessary ports, andestablishes a VPN back to the corporate office for protecting traffic tothe local sandbox); network integrity: 5; memory confidentiality: 5(local management agent configures sandbox container to isolateapplication and data from other applications/threats that may infiltratethe host OS); memory integrity: 5; display confidentiality: 7 (localmanagement agent confirms graphics drivers installed, enforces privacyscreen and uses camera to detect specific onlooker threats); displayintegrity: 7; user authentication: 4 (local agent confirms basic GPOpassword rules are configured, and met by user—e.g., number ofcharacters, no session expiration, etc., but also adds in a requirementfor hardware token to log in and again to establish network); ITadministrator scope: 4 (local agent runs with administrator and remoteaccess privilege, confirms IT admin accounts are listed in local adminuser group—e.g., per GPO); and regulatory compliance: 4 (local agentinstalls state specific rule enforcement or monitoring software).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedlocal confidential file, and the user may begin working in a newlycreated workspace.

Use-Case C

In use-case C, a user may request access to a confidential datafile in aweb hosted remote portal using a browser from Kazakhstan, while at aninternet café with a borrowed/rented PC, such configured as describedwith regard to IHS 100 of FIG. 1 and client IHS 300B of FIG. 3, on anopen Wi-Fi network.

First, a remote workspace orchestration service (332) intercepts theaccess request and evaluates the browser and user context, andcalculates security and productivity scores. In this use-case, there isno local management agent; all that is known is the browser and anytelemetry returned or garnered through the HTTP/S session. Assume, forsake of this example, that the confidential data may kept on a sharedIT-managed network resource on-premises (e.g., back in a main corporateoffice) and that the datafile will remain there with only remoterendering/access privileges. Web-based context may be gathered throughthe browser session or supplied by the user. Moreover, user context mayalso be collected for the workspace orchestration service throughalternate side-channels (e.g., travel calendar information, recent userbilling activity on corporate credit card, phone call logs, and/orlocation data).

When the user selects the desired confidential datafile from the webbrowser, the back-end web server infrastructure calls back to theworkspace orchestration service to request a workspace definition.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “9,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also scored as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 9 (Kazakhstan); userpersona: 1 (user was expected to be there, the timing seems right basedupon past logins, and he has a biometric watch communicator proving heis alive, himself, and located where he says he is—so that IT can alwaystrust him); network risk: 9 (high, public and in a very obscure place);device risk: 9 (zero trust); and regulatory: 8 (based on user, data,location combinations).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “5,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the following contextinformation or inputs, each of which is also given as a resource metricbased upon a selected policy: locale: 3 (internet café device withoutgreat performance); user persona: 9 (known high-confidence and “skilled”classification—advanced compute tasks, proficiency, and speed); networkspeed/latency: 3 (low quality—Wireless G from a long way away); anddevice performance: 3 (have to be able to tolerably browse web pages butbased on what the service believes the capabilities will be, the serviceshould build simple ones).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, a security target may be deemed to have a value of “9”based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads, needs,or demands on security controls and containment features as follows:threat monitoring: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat detection: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat analytics: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat response: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);storage confidentiality: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the serverside); storage integrity: 8; network confidentiality: 10 (high demand,to be handled on the server side); network integrity: 9; memoryconfidentiality: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);memory integrity: 9; display confidentiality: 10 (high, “shouldersurfers” may read datafile from an adjacent seat or table nearby in apublic location); display integrity: 9; user authentication: 10 (high,three-factor authentication using login, hardware token, and biometricsatellite watch—session expiration and refreshes every 30 seconds); ITadministrator scope: 8 (administrator may monitor, manage, and remediateremotely if the user calls them for help or anything unexpectedhappens); and regulatory compliance: 10 (all network traffic is securelymonitored as will the data presented).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “3” (defining a usable secure user experience primarily builtfor consumption and not productivity) based upon a combination ofattribute values representing productivity requirements as follows:local storage: 1 (cache only); CPU access: 3 (build for limitedexpectations); local graphics: 3 (build for limited expectations); andapplication stack: 1 (web browser experience on a kiosk mode device,limited data entry capability, limited read access to need-to-know onlyinformation through VDI rendered kiosk).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and remote cloud web portal (e.g., session theuser logged into through the browser) may assemble the workspace andinstantiate it for the user in the browser. For example, the web portalmay receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.) from theorchestration service, and it may parse the file to implement securityrisk controls such as: threat monitoring: 9 (data center basedmanagement agent installs or confirms prior installation/configurationof TDR software); threat detection: 9 (data center based managementagent installs or confirms prior installation/configuration of TDRsoftware); threat analytics: 9 (orchestration confirms telemetry isaccessible, server hosting web server may be enrolled in logging if notalready enrolled—user behavioral telemetry from side channels may alsobe continuously monitored for suspicious/anomalous activity); threatresponse: 10 (data center-based management agent sets up watchdog timerto kill session automatically without periodic check-ins fromorchestration, user telemetry, and web browser); storageconfidentiality: 9 (data center-based management agent builds aprogressive web application that may be used to display the data througha secure TLS link—the data will be rendered but only the as-neededportions of visualization presented to the user, and nothing can besaved); storage integrity: 10; network confidentiality: 9 (route trafficthrough best effort to secure locations—do not allow anything exceptbitmap renderings through the enforceable network); network integrity:4; memory confidentiality: 9 (web page viewer only—no data leaves thedata center, no confidential input is taken from the rented PC, nokeyboard input is allowed, and all input may be captured from randomizedvirtual keyboard using mouse click coordinates); memory integrity: 8;display confidentiality: 8 (best effort to ensure confidentiality—promptuser at least—adjustable font sizes, but defaults to small fonts,obfuscated text, etc.); display integrity: 2; user authentication: 9(local agent confirms basic password rules are configured, and met byuser—e.g., number of characters, no session expiration, etc., but alsoadds in a requirement for hardware token and biometric, satellite watchto log in and again to establish network, requiring frequentreconfirmation from user); IT administrator scope: 7 (data center-basedremote environment); and regulatory compliance: 8 (local agent does notexist but data center-based agent monitors/blocks data not appropriate).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedrendered data, and the user may begin working in a newly createdworkspace.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart describing certain steps of a process according tovarious embodiments for securing a dynamic workspace in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem. The illustrated embodiment begins at block 405with the user, using an IHS such as described with regard to FIGS. 1 and3, selecting data or an application managed by an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem, such as described with regard to FIGS. 2 and 3,and made available via a launch point. For instance, a user may requestaccess to a data source managed via the enterprise productivityecosystem. Such a data source may include a remote drive located on aspecific server, a remote virtual drive accessed via a cloud system or adata source located on the user's IHS. In some instances, the datasource may be particular folder or file that is located in one of theselocations. In other instances, the user may initiate the process of FIG.4 by requesting access to an application or service that is availablevia a launch point provided by a local management agent.

Upon detecting a request for access to managed data or managed resource,at block 410, the workspace orchestration service may authenticate theidentity of the user making the request. In some embodiments, the localmanagement agent may have previously authenticated the user in order togrant the user access to the launch point and to determine the manageddata sources and applications to present to the user via the launchpoint. In some instances, results from such an authentication by thelocal management agent may be provided to the workspace orchestrationservice. In some embodiments, additional authentication may be requiredin order to evaluate a user's request and to determine a risk score forthe user's request. Accordingly, additional authentication factors maybe required to determine the identity of the user at block 410.

The identity information for the user may be collected by the localmanagement agent and provided to the workspace orchestration service. Atblock 415, the workspace orchestration service may evaluate one or moreattributes describing the level of risk presented by the user. Forinstance, the user may be identified as a high-risk guest user, ahigh-risk employee with a history of security issues, a normal-riskemployee user, a moderate-risk invited guest user, a moderate-riskcontract employee user, a low-risk expert employee user with no historyof security issues, or a low-risk administrative user. Additionally oralternatively, other group classifications may be utilized incategorizing the level of risk presented by user, such as whether theuser is a full-time or part-time employee, or a business group (e.g.,finance, human resources, engineering, sales, technical support, legal)to which the user belongs. In certain instances, different levels ofrisk may be associated with different group classifications. Forinstance, finance users may be associated with a low risk since theyalmost access few types of data and do so from a fixed location within acorporate facility, whereas sales users may be associated with ahigh-risk since they access various types of data from varied locations.In some embodiments, the level of risk presented by a user may beevaluated based on the length of time the user has been affiliated withthe provider of the workspace orchestration service or the length oftime the user has been an employee of a particular company. In someembodiments, the level of risk presented by a user may be evaluatedbased on historical information associated with a particular user, suchas whether the user was previously determined to have violated securitypolicies or failed to follow best practices utilized by the enterpriseproductivity ecosystem. In additional embodiments, a privilege statusclassification associated with a user (e.g., admin, guest, etc.) mayindicate a level of risk. In such embodiments, changes in privilegestatus classifications may also indicate risk context information. Forinstance, historical privilege status classifications may indicate arecent change of a user's privilege classification from a regular userto an administrative user. Such a scenario may indicate a possiblesecurity breach using this account, thus warranting an elevated riskscore for a workspace request from this user.

In addition to authenticating the identity of the user making therequest, the identity of the IHS used to make the request may also beauthenticated. In some embodiments, the identity of the IHS may bedetermined based on a unique identifier associated with the IHS, such asa service tag or serial number or device ID of FIG. 3. Based on suchunique identifiers, an IHS may be particularly identified by theworkspace orchestration service and, in certain instances, may be usedto determine specific hardware and software capabilities of the IHS. Asdescribed with regard to IHS 100 of FIG. 1, the integrity of variouscomponents of an IHS may be confirmed using reference signaturesgenerated for these components during a trusted manufacturing process ofan IHS or during trusted administration of an IHS. In such embodiments,the identity of an IHS may be authenticated as being a particular IHSthat includes components that can be confirmed as being non-compromised.At block 420, the local management agent of an IHS may collect identityinformation that is provided to the workspace orchestration servicewhere, at block 425, the hardware identity information may be used todetermine risk attributes associated with the hardware of the IHS.

The risk attributes of the IHS hardware may indicate a level of riskassociated with a particular IHS. A highest risk level may be assignedto an IHS for which little or no hardware information is available, suchas a guest user operating an unrecognized IHS. A high-risk level mayalso be assigned to an IHS that can be confirmed as being previouslycompromised, such as based on log information associated with thatparticular IHS. A moderate risk level may be assigned to an IHS from afirst manufacturer with a history of security issues, while a lower risklevel may be assigned to an IHS from a second manufacturer with fewersecurity issues. An IHS utilizing internal hardware components withoutdated firmware may be assigned a higher risk level than an IHSutilizing the latest firmware for internal hardware components. A mediumrisk level may be assigned to an IHS that has been configured in anon-recommended manner, such as configuring UEFI attributes to disablesecure boot procedures on the IHS or enabling use of certain USB orother I/O ports. A lowest risk level may be assigned to a recognized IHSthat can be confirmed as utilizing non-compromised hardware elements,such as based on verification of firmware signatures.

At block 430, the software identity of the IHS used to make the requestmay be determined. The software identity of the IHS describes thelogical environment in which a workspace may be deployed. In certaininstances, the software identity of an IHS may be indicated by theoperating system of the IHS and may include version information for theoperating system and updates and patches that have been applied to theoperating system. The software identity of the IHS may also identifysecurity-related software applications supported by the operatingsystem, including security applications such as firewalls, anti-virussoftware and security suites such as DELL DATA GUARDIAN that may beconfigured to securely manage credentials and other security informationstored in a secure component such as the trusted controller 115supported by IHS 100 of FIG. 1. The software identity of the IHS mayalso identify all applications and/or processes operating within theoperating system of the IHS. In such embodiments, the software identityinformation may further include version information and updateinformation for some or all of the applications presently running in theoperating system of the IHS. The update information may indicate whetherspecific patches (e.g., patches addressing specific securityvulnerabilities) have been installed on the IHS and/or the date of themost recent patch to the IHS or to an application of the IHS. Asdescribed, in some embodiments, the local management agent may operatein full or in part within a secure execution environment running on atrusted controller that operates separate from the OS of the IHS. Thesoftware identity of the IHS may thus also include the level ofisolation of the local management agent.

As with the hardware identity information of the IHS, the softwareidentity information may be provided to the workspace orchestrationservice. At block 435, the software identity information may be used indetermining risk attributes associated with the logical environment ofthe IHS from which the user has requested access to a managed datasource or other resource. For instance, a high-risk logical environmentmay be indicated based on the lack of updates to the operating system ofthe IHS. A moderate-risk logical environment may be indicated by anupdated operating system in which several other applications are in use,including applications that support user inputs, such as a wordprocessing application, that may be used to manually reproduceinformation provided via a workspace that would also operate within theoperating system. They lower-risk logical environment may be indicatedwhen the applications operating within the operating system arepredominantly for providing the user with media outputs, such as a mediaplayer or gaming application, where user inputs are not used for dataentry. A higher-risk logical environment may be indicated when one ofthe applications is a web browser that may provide a user with a widerange of web-based tools and applications, such as web-based email andfile transfer, that may not be readily monitored or tracked. Amoderate-risk logical environment may be indicated any time anapplication, such as an email client or FTP client, is operating thatsupports transmission of data files.

In many scenarios, the physical environment in which the IHS is locatedmay be indicative of risk. At block 440, the physical location of theIHS may be determined. As described with regard to FIG. 1, an IHSaccording to embodiments may be configured to collect various types oflocation information. For instance, geographic coordinates of an IHS maybe collected from available sensors or generated based on triangulationinformation. Location information may also be ascertained based on theidentity of network broadcast signals that are detected by the networkinterfaces of the IHS. In some embodiments, the precision of determinedlocation information may be improved based on the strengths of variouswireless signals that are detected by the IHS, thus providing an abilityto identify the location of an IHS within a specific room or other area.In some embodiments, such location information may be collected by thelocal management agent operating on IHS as part of a request for accessto a managed data sources or other resources.

At block 445, the location information reported by a local managementagent may be utilized by workspace orchestration service in order todetermine risk attributes associated with the physical location of theIHS. The workspace orchestration service may utilize the receivedlocation information in order to determine a risk attribute associatedwith that location. A low-risk physical location may be indicated bydetermining that the IHS is located at the user's work location based onnetwork information broadcast by a wireless network provided by theuser's employer. A moderate-risk physical location may be indicated bylocation information indicating the IHS is located at a regularly usedlocation, such as a coffee shop in the vicinity of the user'semployment, via a public wireless network. A moderate-risk physicallocation may also be indicated by location information indicating theIHS is in use while the user is a passenger in an airplane, vehicle orpublic transit and is utilizing any available cellular or publicwireless networks. A higher-risk physical location may be indicated bylocation information indicating the IHS is located at an unrecognizedlocation and using a public wireless network with multiple additionalwireless networks also detected by the IHS. A high-risk physicallocation may also be indicated by location information indicating theIHS is located in a country, city, geo-fenced area, facility, postalcode, area code, or other geographic area that has been categorized asbeing indicative of a high-risk area. A high-risk physical location mayalso be indicated by location information indicating a suspicious changein location of the IHS. For instance, IHS may be identified as beinglocated at the user's regular place of employment in the United Statesduring the morning but, later that afternoon, location information isreceived that asserts the IHS is now located in Europe.

At block 450, risk attributes may be determined for the data source orother resource that has been requested. In some scenarios, a riskclassification may be determined directly based upon a classificationassociated with a data source, application, service or other resource,such as using a designation of data as being confidential, secret,public or privileged. A risk classification may also be determined basedon a type of data that is being requested. For instance, a file typeassociated with financial information or with detailed engineeringschematics may indicate high risk data, whereas a request for astreaming media file may indicate low risk data. Risk classification mayalso be determined based on the location in which requested data isstored. For instance, high risk data may be indicated by its storage ina secured memory of the IHS or another local storage that is integral tothe IHS and has been designated for use in storing important manageddata. Moderate risk data may be indicated by storage in a local orremote storage that has been designated for general use. Moderate riskdata may be indicated by a storage in a trusted and recognized cloudresource, whereas higher risk data may be indicated by a storage in anunrecognized cloud resource.

In various embodiments, risk attributes such as described above may begenerated in any suitable combination of the sequence of operationsdescribed above such that the steps of FIG. 4 may be performed in anyorder and/or concurrently. Embodiments may utilize any or all of thecollected information describing the context in which a workspace willbe instantiated in order to generate risk attributes. In someembodiments, data used in generating risk attributes may collected by alocal management agent operating on the IHS and may be communicated tothe workspace orchestration service for evaluation and calculation, at455, of a risk score associated with the request. In some embodiments, arisk score may be of numerical value within a defined range or scale,such as a risk score between zero and one hundred, or a rating betweenone and ten.

Embodiments may utilize machine learning techniques in the calculationof risk scores. For instance, the various security attributes thatevaluate the levels of risk associated with the user, physicalenvironment, logical environment, IHS, and data may be provided asinputs to machine learning algorithms. In such embodiments, a numericalrisk score may be generated as an output of the machine learning. Thetraining of machine algorithms used in this manner may be accomplishedthrough use of training sets of requests for data or other resources,where each request in the training data is associated with contextinformation and risk attributes for that context. Such manual trainingsets may also associate specific risk scores with different combinationsof risk attributes. Once trained, the machine learning capabilities maybe used to generate risk course for various contexts that not includedin the training set and using new types of risk attributes, such as risklevels associated with new types of managed data sources, or with newtypes of physical locations, or with new metrics specifying levels ofrisk associated with users.

The generated risk score associated with a request may be utilized, at460, in order to determine the security characteristics for a workspacethat supports complying with the request. For instance, a lowest riskscore may be associated with a request by an authenticated user of arecognized IHS at a trusted location, where the request seeks access toan application such as a web browser, gaming application or a streamingmedia player. In response to a request with a such a low risk score, aworkspace definition may be selected that specifies minimal isolation ofthe workspace, places no restrictions on the protocols that may be usedin the transmission of data to and from the workspace, requires noadditional authentication and places no restrictions on the transfer ofdata to or from workspace. A moderate risk score may be associated witha request for regularly accessed data by an authenticated user of arecognized IHS that is at an unrecognized location within a vicinity ofthe user's employment. In such a scenario, a workspace definition may beselected that specifies minimal isolation of the workspace but placesrequirements on encryption levels that must be utilized and requiresperiodic reauthentication of the user. In a higher risk scenario, thesame user may now request access to rarely used financial informationwhile at an unrecognized location that is located in another country. Insuch a scenario, a workspace definition may be selected that specifies agreater degree of isolation, places stringent requirements on the use ofencryption, requires confirmation of the user's identity usingadditional authentication factors and requires periodic authenticationof the user and requires the user remain in close proximity to the IHS.A higher risk scenario may be presented by a newer user utilizing an IHSthat is unrecognized or that cannot be validated as usingnon-compromised hardware. Such a risk score may be associated with aworkspace definition that requires use of a secured and isolated memoryby the workspace. A high-risk scenario may also be presented by arecognized user requesting access to high risk data while utilizing anunrecognized IHS from an unrecognized location. In such a scenario, aworkspace definition may be selected that requires maximum isolation ofthe workspace in which the workspace is instantiated on a cloud resourceand only an immutable image of the requested data is provided via theIHS and maximum use of available authentication factors is required inorder to positively confirm the identity of the user.

In this manner, risk score may be utilized in selecting a workspacedefinition that provides protections that are suited to the context inwhich managed data or other resources will be used. Workspaces generatedin this fashion thus promote providing users with maximum productivityin scenarios where risk levels are low and appropriately reducingproductivity in order to enforce additional security requirements as therisk levels associated with requests increase. Upon determining securityrequirements for a workspace complying with the user's request andgenerating a workspace definition that specifies the securityrequirements, at 465, the workspace orchestration service may transmitthe workspace definition to the IHS, where the definition may be used bythe local management agent to build and operate a workspace thatprovides the user with access to the requested data or other resource.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart describing certain steps of an additional processaccording to various embodiments for securing a dynamic workspace on anongoing basis in an enterprise productivity ecosystem. The embodiment ofFIG. 5 may begin, at block 505, with the instantiation of a workspace onIHS based on requirements set forth in a workspace definition selectedas described in FIG. 4 based on a risk score calculated based on riskattributes describing the context in which the workspace will be used.At block 510, the user operates the workspace in use of managed data orother resources requested by the user. Being that the workspacedefinition that governs the operation of a workspace is selected basedon the context at the time of the user's request, changes to the contextmay alter the risk score, now associated with the ongoing use of therequested data and/or application. Accordingly, at blocks 515, 520, 525,530 various changes in the context of the ongoing use of the requesteddata or other resource may be detected.

For instance, at block 515, the workspace orchestration service mayreceive notifications from the local management agent of changes to thelogical environment in which a workspace is operating. In a scenariowhere a workspace operates as an isolated application within theoperating system of the IHS, the initialization of certain operatingsystem applications may warrant reevaluation of the risk associated withongoing access to managed data via the workspace. For example, aworkspace may provide the user with access to proprietary technicalinformation, such CAD drawings, and use of an application formanipulating the technical information, such as a CAD application. Uponreceiving notification that the user has initialized an emailapplication or gained access to a data store not managed by theenterprise productivity ecosystem, reevaluation of the risk scoreassociated with the ongoing use of the proprietary technical informationmay be warranted. Accordingly, at block 535, the risk attributesassociated with the ongoing use of the proprietary technical informationmay be determined, such as by upgrading the level of risk associatedwith the logical environment in which the workspace operates.

Similarly, at block 520, the detection of requested access to additionaldata or other resources may be detected and provided to the workspaceorchestration service. In certain instances, a workspace may have beengenerated to provide a user access with public or otherwise unprotectedinformation. However, upon detecting an additional user request foraccess to confidential information, reevaluation of the securityrequirements for the workspace may be warranted. In another scenario, aworkspace may provide the user with access to managed data and anapplication for viewing the managed data, but detection of a request foraccess to an application by which the managed data can be modified mayrequire reevaluation of the workspace security requirements. At block540, updated risk attributes may be determined for the updated set ofdata or other resources that are being requested, such as by upgradingthe level of risk associated with the data to be accessed via theworkspace.

At block 525, any modifications to the hardware identity of the IHS maybe reported to the workspace orchestration service. For instance,coupling a removable storage device to the IHS may indicate a change inthe security context. The coupling of a recognized storage device, suchas a regularly used external hard drive, may result in only a minorchange in the risk score for the ongoing use of data, whereas thecoupling of an unrecognized thumb drive may result in a significantchange in the risk score. At block 545, updated risk attributes for thehardware environment in which the workspace operates may be determined.In another example, the detection of the coupling of the IHS to arecognized external display may result in a minor change in the riskscore for ongoing use of data, whereas the coupling of the IHS to anunrecognized projection display may result in a significant change inthe risk attributes associated with the hardware identity of the IHS. Asdescribed, in some embodiments, an IHS may support attestation offirmware used by hardware components. In such embodiments, any inabilityto attest previously validated firmware or the detection of unattestedcomponents may result in a significant change to the hardware identityof the IHS, resulting in a large change in risk scores.

Any detected changes in the physical environment of the IHS may bereported, at block 530, to the workspace orchestration service. Forinstance, if the sensors of the IHS provide indications that the IHS isin transport, the security context may be expected to change based onthe different networks that may be utilized while the IHS is mobile.Accordingly, any changes from a trusted network to a non-trusted networkmay result in significant changes to the risk attributes, determined at550, associated with the physical environment in which the IHS islocated. In some embodiments, an IHS configured according to embodimentsmay detect when the user is present in proximity to the IHS and may alsodetect the presence of additional individuals in close proximity to theIHS. In such embodiments, the detection of additional individuals, andany available identity information associated with those individuals,may be reported to the workspace orchestration service. In somescenarios, continued access to confidential data may be contingent onthe user providing additional authentication information when additionalindividuals are detected in proximity to the IHS. In other scenarios,the use of external displays may be disabled by a workspace in responseto the detection of additional individuals in proximity to the IHS.

At block 560, the updated risk attributes are utilized to generate anupdated risk score for the ongoing access to requested data and/orapplications in light of the detected change in context. As describedwith regard to FIG. 4, machine learning algorithms may be trained tocalculate numerical risk cores based on inputs that characterize thevarious risk attributes that describe the context in which a workspaceis deployed or will be deployed. At block 565, the securitycharacteristics of the currently deployed workspace, as specified by itsworkspace definition, are evaluated based on the updated risk scoreresulting from the change in security context. If the current workspacedefinition does not provide adequate security for the updated level ofrisk, at block 570, an updated workspace definition is determined andtransmitted for use by the local management agent in adapting orreinitializing the workspace based on the updated workspace definition.

In various embodiments, a user's workspace may be dynamically createdand adjusted based on user requirements and environment context—whichmay result in greater productivity, but it may also increase thesecurity risk by producing a greater attack surface. For example, insome situations, a user may be allowed to install and execute non-vettedapplications (e.g., to perform selected tasks) in a workspace, insteadof being limited only to applications that have already been vetted,trusted, and/or recommended by Information Technology (IT)administrators and/or the workspace orchestration service 206. In thosesituations, however, there is a higher probability that an unknownand/or non-vetted application may fail or get compromised, resulting inloss of workspace session, data, and productivity of the user.

To address these, and other issues, workspace orchestration service 206may be configured to create an alternative or parallel workspacedefinition in the background (i.e., unbeknownst to, or unsolicited by,the user of client IHS 300B), such that the alternative workspacedefinition is associated with or otherwise identifies a vettedapplication that corresponds to the non-vetted application. In somecases, the vetted application may be automatically identified, and itmay have similar (or better) features for performing the user'sworkload, compared to the non-vetted application executed by the user inthe original workspace. For example, an IT administrator may maintain alist or pool of vetted applications by continuously learning about thetypes of applications used (e.g., by employees in an organization) andsecurity risks associated with the application, and a vetted applicationmay be automatically selected from that pool. In some cases, the vettedapplication pool may be dynamic, applications may be added and removedfrom the pool based upon how vulnerable or patched they are.

In some implementations, a non-vetted application may include anysoftware application that is identified on a blacklist (e.g., a list offorbidden applications) associated with, or part of, a workspacedefinition. In other implementations, a non-vetted application mayinclude any software application that is not identified in, or ismissing from, a whitelist (e.g., an exclusive list of allowedapplications) associated with, or part of, the workspace definition.Additionally, or alternatively, a non-vetted application may also be aknown unpatched version of the application.

When a user's original workspace with a non-vetted application getscompromised or fails, it may trigger the creation of a new workspacedefinition that includes an identification of a corresponding trusted orvetted application. Additionally, or alternatively, the criteria forinitiating a workspace transition or migration may be an increase in thesecurity risk score of the original workspace—which may be calculated byobserving workspace behavior or large changes in the workspace from abaseline or threshold value.

Moreover, all (or a subset of all) user actions, data, and targets maybe copied or cloned from the original workspace and used to create orpopulate attribute values in the new workspace definition. A newworkspace may be instantiated using the new workspace definition, andthe user may be transitioned or migrated smoothly to the new workspace,with the vetted application installed or executing, and with the same orsimilar session state as the original workspace immediately prior to thetriggering event.

When the user is transitioned from an untrusted workspace (i.e., aworkspace that has been compromised or that has a security risk scoreabove a threshold) to a trusted workspace (i.e., the parallel,alternative workspace built or for the vetted application), the userdoes not lose any data or actions, and the session can be continued orhanded off between the two workspaces without loss of productivity.

In some cases, the original, compromised workspace may be evaluated foridentifying the reason for the failure. For instance, snapshots of theoriginal workspace may be taken at multiple points during the originalworkspace's lifetime; e.g., when the security risk score crosses any ofset of one or more threshold values. These snapshots may be used forsecurity analysis of the compromised workspace using an ML or AIalgorithm, and/or for automatic rollback in case of failure orcompromise for faster remediation.

On the other hand, if the original workspace, despite executing anon-vetted application, does not fail or is not compromised until theend of the workspace session and/or until the unvetted application isclosed, the transition or migration does not take place. Furthermore,this information (e.g., a statistical indication of success ofexecution) may subsequently be used by the IT administration to reducethe security risk score of the non-vetted application, and eventuallymove it into the vetted application pool, for example, after beingevaluated from a productivity and security perspective.

As such, systems and methods described herein may enable the creation ofalternative parallel workspace definitions with vetted applications forfast swapping in case of security compromise, failure, or increase insecurity risk score of the original, untrusted workspace. Moreover,these systems and methods may also enable the cloning of user actionsand data, as well as of productivity and security targets, from theoriginal workspace into the alternative workspace to enable thefrictionless migration of a session between the two workspaces.

FIG. 6 is a diagram depicting an example of a method for workspacecontinuity and remediation. In various embodiments, method 600 may beperformed through a cooperation between workspace orchestration service206 and local management agent 332. Particularly, at 601, workspaceorchestration service 206 creates a first workspace definition (“Z”). Insome cases, the first workspace definition may list as an attribute, orotherwise be associated with, an unvetted or untrusted application(e.g., when the application is part of the user's originating accessrequest). In other cases, the first workspace definition may be devoidof any attributes that restrict the user's execution of any unvettedapplication in an instantiated workspace.

As a result of client IHS 300B's instantiation of a first workspacebased upon the first workspace definition, the resulting workspace 602allows the installation or execution of the non-vetted application.Then, at 603, in response to the execution of the non-vettedapplication, local management agent 332 detects and transmits copied orcloned workspace session data, including, but not limited to: useractions (e.g., keystrokes, clicks, commands, menu selections, etc.),data context (e.g., identification of a datafile, current state of thedata within the datafile, etc.), productivity target, and securitytarget, to workspace orchestration service 206. In response to receivingthe copied or cloned session data, workspace orchestration service 206creates a second workspace definition (“A”) at 608, which identifies avetted or trusted application (e.g., selected from a vetted applicationpool) that corresponds to the non-vetted or untrusted application of thefirst workspace.

In some embodiments, the vetted and non-vetted applications may each beoffered by different software developers, but the two applications maybe identified as being of a same type (e.g., two different web browsers,two different email clients, two different document processors, twodifferent media editors, etc.). As a result, the two applications mayperform similar operations to execute or facilitate the user's workload.For example, different web browsers may render web content subject tothe same commands or features (e.g., back, forward, home, favorites,history, etc.), which may then be captured as the user actions portionof the workspace session data and translated between the web browsers toenable frictionless migration.

When the security risk score of untrusted workspace 607 increases abovea threshold value, and/or the workspace fails or is compromised, localmanagement agent 332 of client IHS 300B issues a fast swap request toworkspace orchestration service 206. Workspace orchestration service 206transmits one or more other files or policies configured to enable localmanagement agent 332 at 609 to instantiate a second workspace based uponthe second workspace definition, such that the second workspacedefinition allows immediate execution of a vetted applicationcorresponding to the non-vetted application. Moreover, at 609, sessiondata previously collected by workspace orchestration service 206 mayalso be transmitted to local management agent 332 to maintain sessioncontinuity.

It should be understood that various operations described herein may beimplemented in software executed by processing circuitry, hardware, or acombination thereof. The order in which each operation of a given methodis performed may be changed, and various operations may be added,reordered, combined, omitted, modified, etc. It is intended that theinvention(s) described herein embrace all such modifications and changesand, accordingly, the above description should be regarded in anillustrative rather than a restrictive sense.

The terms “tangible” and “non-transitory,” as used herein, are intendedto describe a computer-readable storage medium (or “memory”) excludingpropagating electromagnetic signals; but are not intended to otherwiselimit the type of physical computer-readable storage device that isencompassed by the phrase computer-readable medium or memory. Forinstance, the terms “non-transitory computer readable medium” or“tangible memory” are intended to encompass types of storage devicesthat do not necessarily store information permanently, including, forexample, RAM. Program instructions and data stored on a tangiblecomputer-accessible storage medium in non-transitory form may afterwardsbe transmitted by transmission media or signals such as electrical,electromagnetic, or digital signals, which may be conveyed via acommunication medium such as a network and/or a wireless link.

Although the invention(s) is/are described herein with reference tospecific embodiments, various modifications and changes can be madewithout departing from the scope of the present invention(s), as setforth in the claims below. Accordingly, the specification and figuresare to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense,and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scopeof the present invention(s). Any benefits, advantages, or solutions toproblems that are described herein with regard to specific embodimentsare not intended to be construed as a critical, required, or essentialfeature or element of any or all the claims.

Unless stated otherwise, terms such as “first” and “second” are used toarbitrarily distinguish between the elements such terms describe. Thus,these terms are not necessarily intended to indicate temporal or otherprioritization of such elements. The terms “coupled” or “operablycoupled” are defined as connected, although not necessarily directly,and not necessarily mechanically. The terms “a” and “an” are defined asone or more unless stated otherwise. The terms “comprise” (and any formof comprise, such as “comprises” and “comprising”), “have” (and any formof have, such as “has” and “having”), “include” (and any form ofinclude, such as “includes” and “including”) and “contain” (and any formof contain, such as “contains” and “containing”) are open-ended linkingverbs. As a result, a system, device, or apparatus that “comprises,”“has,” “includes” or “contains” one or more elements possesses those oneor more elements but is not limited to possessing only those one or moreelements. Similarly, a method or process that “comprises,” “has,”“includes” or “contains” one or more operations possesses those one ormore operations but is not limited to possessing only those one or moreoperations.

What is claimed is:
 1. An Information Handling System (IHS), the IHScomprising: instructions stored in at least one memory and executed byat least one processor to: instantiate, using one or more files orpolicies, a first workspace based upon a first workspace definition;allow a user to execute a first workload in the first workspace;determine that the first workspace is compromised by calculating asecurity risk score associated with how the user is operating the IHS;and in response to the determination: instantiate, using one or moreother files or policies, a second workspace based upon a secondworkspace definition; migrate the first workload from the firstworkspace to a second workload in the second workspace; and allow theuser to execute, according to the one or more other files of policies,the second workload in the second workspace corresponding to how theworkload in the first workspace was executed.
 2. The IHS of claim 1,wherein the instructions are further executed to clone user actions anddata collected during execution of the first workload in the firstworkspace, wherein the one or more other files or policies compriseinformation associated with the cloned user actions and data that isapplicable to the second workload in the second workspace.
 3. The IHS ofclaim 1, wherein the first and second workloads each comprise at leastone of executing an application or accessing data from a securelocation.
 4. The IHS of claim 1, wherein the instructions are furtherexecuted to determine that the first workspace is compromised accordingto a security context of the IHS.
 5. The IHS of claim 4, wherein theinstructions are further executed to calculate the security contextaccording to at least one of a risk metric associated with a locale ofthe client IHS, a risk metric associated with a user of the client IHS,a risk metric associated with hardware of the client IHS, a risk metricassociated with a requested datafile, or a regulatory risk metricassociated with the user, the locale, and the requested datafile.
 6. TheIHS of claim 1, wherein the instructions are further executed todetermine that the first workspace is compromised in response to asecurity risk score being equal to or greater than a threshold value,wherein the threshold value comprises a security target associated withthe first workspace definition.
 7. The IHS of claim 1, wherein theinstructions are further executed to select the one or more other filesor policies in anticipation of the determination that the firstworkspace is compromised.
 8. The IHS of claim 1, wherein theinstructions are further executed to terminate the first workspace aftermigrating the first workload to the second workspace.
 9. The IHS ofclaim 1, wherein the first and workspaces are created by a workspaceorchestration service.
 10. A method comprising: instantiating, using oneor more files or policies, a first workspace based upon a firstworkspace definition using one or more files or policies; allowing auser to execute a first workload in the first workspace; determiningthat the first workspace is compromised by calculating a security riskscore associated with how the user is operating the IHS; and in responseto the determination: instantiating, using one or more other files orpolicies, a second workspace based upon a second workspace definition;migrating the first workload from the first workspace to a secondworkload in the second workspace; and allowing the user to execute,according to the one or more other files of policies, the secondworkload in the second workspace corresponding to how the workload inthe first workspace was executed.
 11. The method of claim 10, furthercomprising cloning user actions and data collected during execution ofthe first workload in the first workspace, wherein the one or more otherfiles or policies comprise information associated with the cloned useractions and data that is applicable to the second workload in the secondworkspace.
 12. The method of claim 10, wherein the first and secondworkloads each comprise at least one of executing an application oraccessing data from a secure location.
 13. The method of claim 10,further comprising determining that the first workspace is compromisedaccording to a security context of the IHS.
 14. The method of claim 10,further comprising determining that the first workspace is compromisedin response to a security risk score being equal to or greater than athreshold value, wherein the threshold value comprises a security targetassociated with the first workspace definition.
 15. The client IHS ofclaim 10, further comprising terminating the first workspace aftermigrating the first workload to the second workspace.
 16. A memorystorage device having program instructions stored thereon that, uponexecution by one or more processors of an Information Handling System(IHS) of a workspace orchestration service, cause the IHS to:instantiate, using one or more files or policies, a first workspacebased upon a first workspace definition; allow a user to execute a firstworkload in the first workspace; determine that the first workspace iscompromised by calculating a security risk score associated with how theuser is operating the IHS; and in response to the determination:instantiate, using one or more other files or policies, a secondworkspace based upon a second workspace definition; migrate the firstworkload from the first workspace to a second workload in the secondworkspace; and allow the user to execute, according to the one or moreother files of policies, the second workload in the second workspacecorresponding to how the workload in the first workspace was executed.17. The memory storage device of claim 16, wherein the instructions arefurther executed to clone user actions and data collected duringexecution of the first workload in the first workspace, wherein the oneor more other files or policies comprise information associated with thecloned user actions and data that is applicable to the second workloadin the second workspace.
 18. The memory storage device of claim 16,wherein the instructions are further executed to determine that thefirst workspace is compromised according to a security context of theIHS.
 19. The memory storage device of claim 18, wherein the instructionsare further executed to calculate the security context according to atleast one of a risk metric associated with a locale of the client IHS, arisk metric associated with a user of the client IHS, a risk metricassociated with hardware of the client IHS, a risk metric associatedwith a requested datafile, or a regulatory risk metric associated withthe user, the locale, and the requested datafile.
 20. The memory storagedevice of claim 16, wherein the instructions are further executed toselect the one or more other files or policies in anticipation of thedetermination that the first workspace is compromised.